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21 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
If the conclusion of the majority was justified in fact, their
judgment was, of course, justified in law. Upon the legal questions
involved, the opinion of the minority judges seems unassailable.
That a mere authority to receive the interest does not justify the
receipt of the principal, and that authority to receive the principal
at maturity does not justify receiving prepayments, has been
established by many cases, in addition to those cited in the opinion.,
In attempting to state a "principle" or maxim for the appor-
tionment of losses between "two equally innocent persons," the
court does not seem to have been more successful than many other
courts. Most maxims for dealing with two equally innocent persons
turn out to be maxims for dealing with two unequally innocent
persons.
That the plaintiff was "more at fault" was found by the ma-
jority from the fact that he had not warned the borrowers not to
make payments of principal to the agent. That no such warning
is ordinarily necessary is clear. The majority found it neces-
sary in the present case from the lender's knowledge that the loan
was to a negro church. "He would know they were usually ignor-
ant and easily deceived." That such knowledge may affect the case
seems clear. The minority denied that it was actually the fact in
the present case. FLOYD R. MECHEM.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-SUITS BY
NON-RESIDENTS AGAINST FOREIGN CARRIERS ON FOREIGN CAUSES
OF ACTION.-[Ohio] In Davis, Director-General of Railroads v.
Farmers" Cooperative Equity Co.,' decided in 1923, the federal Su-
preme Court held it a violation of the commerce clause for Minne-
sota to permit suit to be brought in its courts by a Kansas plaintiff
in regard to a purely Kansas transaction against a Kansas railroad
corporation represented in Minnesota only by a resident solicitor of
traffic for its railway lines, all located outside of Minnesota, process
being served on the solicitor. Mr. Justice Brandeis said (for the
court)
"The fact that the business carried on by a corporation is entirely
interstate in character does not render the corporation immune from
the ordinary process of the courts of a state. International Harvester
Co. v. Kentucky (1914) 234 U. S. 579. The requirements of orderly,
effective administration of justice are paramount. . . . [After refer-
ring to Kane v. New Jersey (1916) 242 U. S. 160:] It may be that a
statute like that here assailed would be valid, although applied to suits
in which the cause of action arose elsewhere, if the transaction out of
which it arose had been entered into within the state, or if the plaintiff
was, when it arose, a resident of the state. These questions are not
before us, and we express no opinion upon them. But orderly, effective
6. See Bacot v. Loan & Trust Co. (1925) 132 S. C. 340; Huismain v.
Althoff (Iowa 1926) 209 N. W. 525; Schenk v. Dexter (1899) 77 Minn. 15;
Security Co. v. Graybeal (1892) 85 Iowa 543, 39 Am.. St. Rep. 311; Wagner
v. Grimm (1902) 169 N. Y. 421.
1. (1923) 262 U. S. 312.
COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
administration of justice clearly does not require that a foreign carrier
shall submit to a suit in a state in which the cause of action did not
arise, in which the transaction giving rise to it was not entered upon,
in which the carrier neither owns nor operates a railroad, and in which
the plaintiff does not reside. . . . Avoidance of waste in interstate
transportation, as well as maintenance of service, have become a direct
concern of the public. With these ends the Minnesota statute, as here
applied, unduly interferes. By requiring from interstate carriers gen-
eral submission to suit, it unreasonably obstructs and unduly burdens
interstate commerce."12
In Iron City Produce Co. v. American Railway Express Co.3
the Ohio Court of Appeals has recently extended this doctrine so
as to deny to Ohio the power to permit a Pennsylvania plaintiff to
sue a non-resident express company in the Ohio courts upon a cause
of action arising out of an interstate transaction conducted wholly
outside of Ohio.
The power of a state validly to subject an undomiciled foreign
corporation to suit therein has generally been contested under'the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If a foreign
corporation does no business and has no property there, and has
not actually consented to the jurisdiction, either in advance or by
voluntarily appearing in the suit, a state cannot authorize a judg-
ment, good even where rendered, upon any personal cause of action
whatever, although service be had upon corporate officers tem-
porarily or permanently within the state.4 Upon general principles
a foreign corporation may of course actually consent to the jurisdic-
tion of a state's courts, either generally or for the purposes of a
particular suit, and, when this consent is evidenced by the actual
appointment by the corporation of an agent to accept the-service of
process generally within the state, actions by non-residents upon
causes of action arising wholly outside the state may be included
at the will of the state.5 Where a state law provides that foreign
corporations doing business within the state may be sued by service
of process upon a public officer, but the corporation has not in fact
consented to this or appeared in the suit, such service will not
support a judgment upon a cause of action arising from transac-
tions outside of the state, even though obtained by a resident of the
state.6 In both of the federal Supreme Court cases deciding this,
the public official served did not in fact notify the defendant of
2. 262 U. S. at 317.
3. (Ohio App. 1926) 153 N. E. 316.
4. Riverside etc. Mills v. Menefee (1915) 237 U. S. 189 (cases). As to
the effect that may be given by the state to an actual appearance to contest
the jurisdiction, see York v. Texas (1890) 137 U. S. 15; Western Indemnity
Co. v. Rupp (1914) 235 U. S. 261; Chicago Life Ins. Co. V. Cherry (1917)
244 U. S. 25.
5. Sinolik v. Phil. & Reading CoaA & Iron Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y.
1915) 222 Fed. 148; Bagdon v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co. (1917) 217
N. Y. 432; Pennsylviania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Jssve M. & M. Co. (1917)
243 U. S. 93.
6. Old Wayne Mut. Life Assn. v. McDonough (1907) 204 U. S. 8;
Sinwn v. Southern Ry. (1915) 236 U. S. 115.
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the suit and judgment was taken by default, so the decisions might
have gone upon the lack of constitutional notice of the litigation;
but they were not put upon this ground but upon the more general
one that, while a foreign corporation, by doing business in a state,
must be held to have "assented" to such (presumably reasonable)
terms as the state may impose regarding service of, process in
actions regarding such business, such "assent" would not be "im-
plied" as to business transacted outside the state. This "assent,"
however, has been latterly frankly recognized to be only a fiction, 7
so that any, reasoning based upon its quality of genuine consensu-
ality is of dubious validity.
When a foreign corporation does business in a state by its own
voluntarily appointed agents, the federal Supreme Court has said
that it may be sued in the federal courts of that state (or of the
District of Columbia) by -service upon such agents upon a transi-
tory cause of action arising outside of the state, by either a resi-
dents of the state, or even by a non-resident, 9 and even in the ab-
sence of any state or federal statutory authority for such suits.
Local statutory authority to this effect is upheld in several well-
considered state cases.10 It is possible that the above federal deciz:
sions may be reconsidered in the light of later analysis," even
under the Fourteenth Amendment; but, assuming them to be valid
against that objection, how far does the commerce clause forbid
such jurisdiction to state courts against corporations engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce? The Davis case' 2 presents the
strongest situation for such restraint, a foreign railway corpora-
tion, without lines in the state, engaged wholly in the solicitation
of interstate traffic, sued by a non-resident upon a foreign transac-
tion. In the principal case the defendant had lines in the state and
did a substantial internal business also. If it had done no inter-
state business, the validity of the Minnesota statute allowing local
suits on foreign claims of non-residents would have been clear
under the authorities above cited. The effect upon its interstate
commerce of allowing such suits is both direct and indirect: inter-
state employees are called away from their regular occupations to
go to other states as witnesses, and the resulting expense is prac-
tically a charge upon the whole business, state and interstate.
During the late war the burden of such practices was so great
7. Smolik v. Phil. & Reading C. & I. Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1915) 222
Fed. 148, 151, approved by Holmes, J., for the court in Pennsylvania Fire
Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue M. & M. Co. (1917) 243 U. S. 93, 96.
8. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Harris (1871) 12 Wall 65 (suit in
District of Columbia by a resident thereof against a Maryland railroad
corporation for a Virginia tort).
9. Barrow SS. Co. v. Kane (1898) 170 U. S. 100 (suit in federal courts
of New York by resident of New Jersey against a British steamship corpora-
tion for an Irish tort).
10. Reynolds v. M. K. & T. Ry. (1917) 228 Mass. 584; Rishmiller v.
D. R. & G. R. R. (1916) 134 Minn. 261; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.(1917) 220 N. Y. 259.
11. See A. W. Scott in (1926) Harv. Law. Rev. 39: 579-80, note.
12. See note 1, above.
COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
that the Director-General of Railroads issued an order requiring
all tort suits against railroads to be brought where the cause of
action arose or where the plaintiff resided. This was upheld as a
reasonable order in Alabama & Vicksburg Ry. v. Journey,13 and
the facts upon which the order was based were said to be of
general application in time of peace as well as war in the Davis
case, above.
In the absence of congressional action it is difficult to predict
whether the federal courts will hold the permitting of such suits
enough of a burden on interstate commerce to be invalid or not.
State regulation *of intrastate railway rates unfavorably affecting
interstate rates and earnings on the same road was held not invalid,
without congressional action, in the Minnesota Rate Cases;14 while
heavy state penalties for not furnishing cars for local shipments
on demand, likely to cause such shipments to be preferred to inter-
state ones, was held bad per se under the commerce clause., 5  The
The older case of Barrow Steamship Ca. v. Kane 6 permitted a
New Jersey plaintiff to sue a British steamship company in the
federal courts of New York for a personal tort committed in Ire-
land. The defendant was doubtless engaged wholly in forign
commerce, though no mention was made of this in the case, but it
had terminals in New York and its ships entered and left the state,
so it was not necessarily within the protection of the Davis case,
above, where the defendant operated no lines in the state of the
forum. Besides, the hardship of compelling an American plaintiff
to resort to the courts of Great Britain to sue upon a transitory
tort action is obvious. But it is doubtful how far the Barrow case
can be considered a binding authority today in the absence of any
discussion in it of the commerce point, first raised in later cases.
An up-to-date decision of the Supreme Court upon the matter
would be welcome.
JAMES PARKER HALL.
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE AND STREIXES-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
-KANSAS INDUSTRIAL AcT.-[United States] The recent case of
Dorchy v. Kansas' evidences that the Kansas Industrial Court Act,
although considerably limited in scope by several decisions of the
United States Supreme Court,2 still retains sufficient vitality, espe-
cially in its penal features, to warrant limitations upon the right of
13. (1921) 257 U. S. 111.
14. (1913) 230 U. S. 352. Federal regulation of all railroad rates is
valid, however, on account of the effect of local rates upon the total income
of the roads from which they must be maintained for interstate as well as
local purposes. See Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. C. B. & Q. R. R.(1922) 257 U. S. 563.
15. St. Louis, etc., Rj,. v. Arkansas (1910) 217 U. S. 136.
16. (1898) 170 U. S. 100.
1. (1926) 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 86.
2. The first case coming to the United States Supreme Court involving
the Kansas Industrial Court Act found no federal question present, and the
case, therefore, was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction: Howat v. Kansas
